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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TODD FLEMAL,

:

Petitioner,

:

v.

:

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, CHAD
EWING, d.b.a. ITALIAN DRYWALL, and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'FUND,

:

Case No. 20110022-CA

:

Respondents.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Mr. Flemal was injured on April 16, 2007. Flemal had been employed by Chad
Ewing (d.b.a. Italian Drywall). The only disputed issue before the Utah Labor
Commission was whether Flemal's employment had been terminated before he was
injured. R. 145. The Commission determined that Ewing had terminated Flemal's
employment before Flemal was injured. Is the Commission's determination supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole?

1
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ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: An agency's
determination of fact will be overturned on appeal only if the petitioner has been
substantially prejudiced and the determination is not "supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4403(4)(g) (West 2009). "Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support
more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the
evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 2007 UT 42, f35, 164 P.3d 384 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 12, 2009, Flemal filed an application for hearing with the Commission.
R. 1-8. Flemal sought workers5 compensation benefits for an injury that he claimed
occurred while he was working for Chad Ewing. R. 1. The Uninsured Employers' Fund
contested Flemal's claim that his injury arose in the course and scope of his employment.
R. 12. At the evidentiary hearing, Ewing and Nicholas Bassett testified that Flemal had
been fired before the injury, and had been told not to perform any more work. R. 162 at
49-54, 58-65. The Administrative Law Judge held that Flemal was employed at the time
of his injury because Ewing had failed to adequately fire him. "The preponderance of the
evidence shows that Ewing attempted to terminate the Petitioner on the morning of April
16, 2007. Unfortunately he failed to escort the Petitioner off the premises." R. 77.
2
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The Commission reversed the ALJ's decision, making a determination of fact that
Ewing had terminated Flemal's employment before Petitioner's injury. R. 158.1 Based in
part on this determination, the Commission held that Flemal was not acting in the course
of employment at the time of his injury. The Commission therefore denied Flemal's
claim for benefits. R. 158-59. Flemal filed a timely petition for judicial review with this
•••••••••';

C o u r t .

••''••:^:

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Todd Flemal was employed by Chad Ewing to perform cleanup on job sites. R.
162 at 56. On April 16,2007, Mr. Ewing fired Flemal for bringing drugs to the job site.
Id. at 58-59. Both Ewing and Bassett testified that Flemal was fired and told not to do
anymore work, but to wait until Ewing could give him a ride home. Id. at 49-54, 58-65.
Bassett testified that Flemal was acting contrary to these instructions when he was
injured. Id. at 50, 54. Flemal testified that he had not been fired. Id. at 24-25;
The only issue Flemal raised before the Commission was whether he had been
fired before he was injured. R. 145.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The sole issue presented to the Commission was whether Flemal was employed by
Chad Ewing at the time he was injured. R. 145. The Commission reviewed the testimony
of Flemal, Ewing, and Bassett. It concluded that Bassett's testimony was the most

1

The record contains an unnumbered page before page 158. That page is relevant

as well.
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persuasive. R. 158. Weighing the evidence, the Commission made a determination of
fact that Flemal had been fired and told not to perform anymore work prior to his injury.
R. 158-59.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's
determination. Adopting an erroneous standard of review, Flemal argues that any doubt
as to coverage should be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Seeking to place the
burden of proof on the respondents to show the correctness of the Commission's decision,
Flemal also fails to argue that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the
Commission's determination of fact. The Commission's decision should be affirmed on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF FACT THAT FLEMAL'S
EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED BEFORE HIS ACCIDENT
Flemal asks this Court to use the wrong standard of review in considering his
challenge to the Commission's factual findings. Br. of Petitioner 9-16. Utah's
Administrative Procedures Act states:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:...
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009). See also Sierra Club v. Utah Air
Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, f 9, 148 P.3d 960.
The Commission determined that Flemal was not employed by Ewing at the time
of his injury; that Flemal had been fired. Flemal doesn't claim that there is no substantial
evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination. Instead; he asks this
Court to use two other standards of review. First, Flemal claims that any doubts as to
coverage should be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Br. of Petitioner at 9-11. His
only support for this claim is a series of cases stating that Utah's Workers' Compensation
Act should be liberally construed, id. at 9-10, however none use the standard of review
for factual determinations urged by Flemal. Indeed, in one of the cases Flemal cites, the
Utah Supreme Court held that it would "affirm the Commission on contradictory
evidence, if there is substantial competent evidence to sustain it." Baker v. Indus,
Comm'n, 405 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1965), abandoned in unrelated part, Allen v. Indus.
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Notably in Baker, the Court did not reject the
Commission's factual determination because all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
injured worker, but because there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the
challenged determination of fact. Id. at 614-15.
And in Crafts v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 238,2 this Court used the
substantial evidence standard to review a challenge to the Commission's determinations

2

Unpublished decisions of this Court are binding precedential authority. Grand
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, T[16,, 44 P.3d 734. Seealso Utah R. App. P. 30(f).
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of fact. Id at *1. Further, this Court held that the petitioner was not relieved of his
burden to prove his injuries were covered by the Workers' Compensation Act by the
requirement that the act be liberally construed in favor of finding coverage when the
statutory terms reasonably permit such an interpretation. Id.

*

To further deflect this Court's attention, Flemal also tries
proof on the respondents. Br. of Petitioner at 11-16. Without any citation to authority,
petitioner asks this Court to, de novo, assess the credibility of the witnesses. It is not this
Court's "prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence." VanLeeuwen v. Indus.
Comm'n. 901 P.2d28L 284 (Utah App 1995). Instead the reviewing court gives
deference to the factual determinations of administrative bodies. The Commission's
factual findings should be upheld if there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence that
supports them in the record.

•

;

Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support "more than a
mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the
evidence." An administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence
test when "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" the evidence
supporting the decision,
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 2007 UT 42, f35, 164 P.3d 384 (citation omitted).
The only issue on appeal is the correctness of the Commission's fact
determinations that Flemal was fired before his injury. That Flemal had been told not to
perform any more work. The testimony of Chad Ewing and Nicholas Bassett supports
these fact determinations. Their testimony was that Flemal was fired before his injury.
Petitioner has failed to show that the Commission's determinations of fact are
6

-..
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unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.3 The final agency action should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Uninsured Employers' Fund asks this Court to
affirm the final agency action.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 2011.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Uninsured Employers' Fund

3

The Uninsured Employers' Fund joins in Respondent Chad Ewing's argument
that Flemal failed to marshal all of the evidence that supports the Commission's
determinations of fact. Br. of Respondent Chad Ewing at 7-8. The Commission's
decision should be affirmed for this additional reason.
7
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Determinative Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (West 2009)
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has
failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making
body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency;
or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

TODD FLEMAL,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER REVERSING
ALJ'S DECISION AND
DENYING BENEFITS

CHAD EWING, d.b.a. ITALIAN
DRYWALL, and UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND,

Case No. 09-0026

Respondents.

Chad Ewing, a sole proprietor doing business as Italian Drywall, and the Uninsured
Employers Fund ("UEF") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Marlowe's award of benefits to Todd Flemal under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 63 G4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Flemal claims benefits for left-hand injuries resulting from an accident on April 16,
2007. According to Mr. Flemal, the accident occurred while he was working for Mr. Ewing, but Mr.
Ewing asserts he had terminated Mr. Flemal's employment prior to the accident.
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Marlowe concluded that an employment relationship
continued to exist between Mr. Ewing and Mr. Flemal at the time of the April 16 accident and that
Mr. Flemal's injuries arose out of and in the course of that employment. Judge Marlowe therefore
ordered Mr. Ewing and the UEF1 to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Flemal.
Mr. Ewing's motion for review of Judge Marlowe's decision reiterates that Mr. Flemal was
not Mr. Ewing's employee when the April 16 accident occurred; consequently, Mr. Flemal's injuries
did not arise in the course of employment. Mr. Ewing also argues that, even if there was an
employment relationship, the actions leading to the accident were outside the scope of Mr. Flemal's
employment. Finally, Mr. Ewing contends the evidence does not support Judge Marlowe's
determination of Mr. Flemal's compensation rate. The UEF joins in Mr. Ewing's arguments.
1

Pursuant to § 34A-2-704 (1) (a) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the UEF assists in
paying worker's compensation benefits to injured workers whose employers are uninsured and
insolvent, r
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ORDER REVERSING ALJ'S DECISION AND DENYING BENEFITS
TODD FLEMAL
PAGE 2 OF 5
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the material facts regarding Mr. Flemal's employment and accident are undisputed.
On approximately March 1, 2007, Mr. Ewing, a dry wall contractor, hired Mr. Flemal as a helper.
Mr. Ewing paid Mr. Flemal in cash, without withholding any taxes or providing any wage statement
or other documentation. Mr. Ewing also failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance
coverage for his employees.
Because Mr. Flemal did not have a car, Mr. Ewing drove him to and from the various work
sites. On the morning of April 16, 2007, Mr. Ewing drove Mr. Flemal to a dry wall project in
Syracuse, Utah. Mr. Bassett, another of Mr. Ewing's employees, was also working at the site. That
day, as Mr. Flemal was standing on a crate to finish the basement ceiling, the crate gave way. Mr.
Flemal fell and a 114 inch screw lodged in left hand.
While the foregoing facts are not in dispute, other relevant facts are sharply disputed.
Mr. Ewing testified that after he and Mr. Flemal arrived at the job site, he observed Mr.
Flemal with a hypodermic needle containing a substance Mr. Ewing believed to be a drug. Based on
this observation, Mr. Ewing told Mr. Flemal "he wasn't needed anymore." Mr. Ewing then left Mr.
Flemal at the job site because Mr. Ewing had to pick his children up from school.
Mr. Bassett, the other employee present at the accident scene, corroborates Mr. Ewing's
statements. Mr. Bassett heard Mr. Ewing tell Mr. Flemal that his help wasn't needed anymore; that
Mr. Flemal was not to perform any work; and that he would take Mr. Flemal home after he picked
his children up. Mr. Bassett testified that after Mr. Ewing left the work site, Mr. Flemal said "since
I'm here I'm going to sweep." Later, Mr. Bassett saw Mr. Flemal standing on the crate to work on
the ceiling, and then fall from the crate.
Mr. Flemal tells a different story. He denies that Mr. Ewing terminated his employment or
told him not to do any work on April 16. To the contrary, Mr. Flemal testified that, after he and Mr.
Ewing arrived at the Syracuse job site on April 16, Mr. Ewing assigned various tasks to him. Mr.
Flemal was in the process of performing his work when he fell from the crate and injured his hand.
Mr. Flemal denied possessing a hypodermic needle at work that day. However, he was equivocal
about his actual use of drugs that day and he admitted intravenous methamphetamine use and
marijuana use before and after the day of the accident.
Mr. Flemal's version of events cannot be reconciled with the testimony of Mr. Ewing and Mr.
Bassett. In considering which, if either, version is true, the Commission notes that both Mr. Flemal
and Mr. Ewing have a financial interest in the outcome of this matter. Mr. Flemal's credibility is
diminished by his admitted drug use and his unconvincing testimony regarding his use of drugs on
the day in question. Mr. Ewing's credibility is diminished by his failure to comply with several '-state
and federal tax and employment laws—in particular, his failures to document payment of wages,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ORDER REVERSING ALJ'S DECISION AND DENYING BENEFITS
TODDFLEMAL
PAGE3 0 F 5
maintain workers' compensation coverage, or withhold payroll taxes. Additionally, the fact that Mr.
Ewing allowed Mr. Flemal to remain on the work site after his purported firing suggests that Mr.
Flemal was never fired at all. However, that inference is rebutted by Mr. Ewing's explanation of his
need to pick up his children from school before he could take Mr. Flemal home.
While the testimony of Mr. Flemal and Mr. Ewing is subject to doubt, Mr. Bassett's
testimony is more persuasive. He has no direct personal interest in this matter. His testimony was
direct and internally consistent. Although Mr. Bassett was not present in the hearing room to hear
Mr. Ewing's testimony, his testimony corroborated Mr. Ewing's version of events. The Commission
therefore accepts the testimony of Mr. Ewing and Mr. Bassett regarding the events leading to Mr.
Flemal's accident on April 16.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical and
disability benefits to employees injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment." The threshold issue in this case is whether, at the time of his accident on
April 16, Mr. Flemal was still employed by Mr. Ewing so that his injuries can be said to arise "in the
course" of that employment.
In Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of
Appeals noted that
. . . an inj ury occurs in the course of employment when it takes place (1) within the period of
employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of [the
employee's] duties, and (3) while [the employee] is fulfilling those duties or engaged in
doing something incidental thereto. . . . Moreover, all three criteria of time, place and
circumstances must be fulfilled in order for a claimant to recover workers' compensation
benefits."
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original.)
In Walls, ibid, the individual seeking workers' compensation benefits had stayed at her place
of employment for several hours after her shift had ended in order to socialize. The Court of
Appeals observed that courts of other jurisdictions "have consistently held that employees who
remain on the work premises following their employment for their own social purposes are not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits." Walls at 968. While Mr. Flemal did not remain at the
work site in this case for "social purposes," but was instead waiting for a ride home, the Commission
does not view that difference as significant. The fact remains that Mr. Flemal's employment had
ended. His subsequent actions, which resulted in his accident and injury, were not within the period
of his employment and, consequently, were not in the course of his employment. Consequently, his
injuries are not compensable under § 34A-2-401 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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ORDER REVERSING ALJ'S DECISION AND DENYING BENEFITS
TODDFLEMAL
PAGE 4 OF 5
^ ORDER
The Commission sets aside Judge Marlowe's award of benefits in this matter. The
Commission concludes that Mr. Flemal's injuries did not arise in the course of his employment and
for that reason are not compensable under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Mr. Flemal's
claim for benefits is therefore dismissed. It is so ordered.
Dated this / T ^ d a y of December, 2010.

14

Sherrie Haj<as{ii
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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ORDER REVERSING ALJ'S DECISION AND DENYING BENEFITS
TODDFLEMAL
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits
in the matter of Todd Flemal, Case No. 09-0026, was mailedfirstclass postage prepaid this / ^ d a y
of December, 2010, to the following:
Todd Flemal
3544 Ogden Ave
OgdenUT 84403
Chad Ewing dba Italian Drywall
4285 Jefferson Ave
OgdenUT 84403
Uninsured Employers Fund
Karen Helphand Designated Agent
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Michael Belnap, Esq.
2610 Washington Blvd
OgdenUT 84401
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
136 ES Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Edward O. Ogilvie, Esq.
160 E 300 S 3rd Fl
Box 146650
Salt Lake City UT 84114

vmt
Sara Danielson
Utah
Labor Commission
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Westta\A4
Page 1
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1243759 (Utah App.),

UT App 238

(Cite as: 2005 WL 1243759 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Millard R. CRAFTS, Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION; and Yellow Freight Systems,
Inc., Respondents.
CaseNo.20030712-CA.
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We will overturn the Commission's factual findings
only if they are "not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (quotations and citation
omitted). "[T]his court will not substitute its judgment as
between two reasonably conflicting views...." Id. "It is the
province of the [Commission], not appellate courts, to
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for
the [Commission] to draw the inferences." Id. "When an
agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the
law, we will not disturb the agency's application unless its
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citation omitted).

Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
DAVIS, Judge:
*1 Petitioner Millard R. Crafts seeks review of a
decision of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission)
affirming a decision of a Commission Administrative Law
Judge, which denied and dismissed Crafts's Applications
for Hearing requesting permanent total disability
compensation benefits from Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
(Yellow Freight) for an alleged industrial accident that
occurred in 1997 (the 1997 incident). We affirm.
Crafts argues that the Commission erred in denying
his claim because (1) the signed and approved
compensation agreement for permanent partial disability
compensation (compensation agreement) he entered into
with Yellow Freight is entitled to administrative finality
status, permitting it to be final, appealable, and entitled to
res judicata effect; and (2) he has satisfied the threshold
requirement for a tentative finding of permanent total
disability-that he was significantly impairedfromthe 1997
incident.

Although, as Crafts notes, the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§
34A-2-101 to -803 (2001 & Supp.2004), is to be construed
"liberally and in favor of employee coverage when
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction,"
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 196 P. 2d 676, 679 (Utah
1990), Crafts is not thereby relieved of the burden of
proving that his injuries were caused by the 1997 incident.
The Act provides that
[t]o establish entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial
accident...;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of
the employee's permanent total disability.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii) (2001).
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*2 Crafts argues that the executed compensation
agreement conclusively establishes that he has a 3%
permanent impairment resulting from the 1997 incident,
and that Yellow Freight is barred by res judicata and \
estoppel from denying their previous stipulation to that
effect. However, even assuming Crafts is correct on this
point, and that the compensation agreement is conclusive
as to the 3% impairment rather than merely being some
evidence to that effect, with only a 3% permanent partial
impairment Crafts has nonetheless failed to demonstrate
that he "sustained a significant impairment or combination
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident." Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) (emphasis added). Crafts,
therefore, is not entitled to permanent total disability
compensation from Yellow Freight.
Even if we give the compensation agreement the legal
effect Crafts urges, the Commission's determination that
Crafts failed to provide sufficient evidence that he was
significantly impaired as a result of the 1997 incident is
unassailable. We decline to disturb the Commission's
dismissal of Crafts's claim.
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and
GREGORY K.ORME. Judges.
UtahApp.,2005.
Crafts v. Labor Com'n
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1243759 (Utah App.),
2005UTApp238
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